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Housing Policies in China: Issues and Options
* 
 
This article consists in three parts. The first part deals with theory. We evaluate the pros and 
cons of government involvement in urban housing and of renting versus ownership. In the 
second part, we summarize the different housing policies that have been implemented in the 
United States, Europe, and Asia. We draw some conclusions. In particular, we show that 
there is a tradeoff between encouraging home ownership and social housing since countries 
that have favor the former have neglected the latter (like Japan, Spain, etc.). In the third part, 
we use the theory and the international policy parts to address housing policy issues in 
China. One of the main concerns in Chinese cities is the raise of poverty mainly by “illegal” 
migrants (who are Chinese rural residents) living in “urban villages”. We propose two steps to 
fight against poverty in Chinese cities. The first one is to require that the Chinese government 
recognizes these “illegal” migrants by helping them becoming “legal”. The second step is to 
encourage social housing that directly or indirectly subsidizes housing for the poor. In that 
case, to fight against poverty, one can either implement place-targeted policies (like the 
enterprise zone programs in the US and Europe and/or housing projects in the US, UK, or 
France) or people-targeted policies (like the MTO programs in the US). We also discuss 
other issues related to poverty. In particular, we suggest that the government could also try to 
keep migrants in rural areas by attracting firms there and/or introduce a microfinance system 
that helps them become entrepreneurs. 
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1  Introduction 
 
China  is  an  amazing  and  unusual  country.  At  the  end  of  2008,  China’s  total 
population was 1.33 billion, with 723 million (54%) and 607 million (46%) residing in 
the rural and urban areas, respectively. The rural population fraction was 64% in 2001 
and 74% in 1990. About 94% of population lives on approximately 46% of land. Despite 
these amazing figures, inequalities, slums and poverty have started to rise in Chinese 
cities partly because of the very-market oriented housing policies implemented in the last 
decades and partly because of China’s unique hukou system of home registration, which 
restricts permanent migration to cities but allows a large amount of temporary migration, 
thereby creating a group of urban residents with restricted rights known as the “floating 
population”. 
In this paper, we investigate a little bit closer these issues. For that, we will first 
expose some theoretical mechanisms behind any housing policy. In Section 2.1., we will 
evaluate  the pros  and  cons  of  government  involvement  in urban  housing,  distinguish 
between  the  traditional  approach,  which  considers  the  housing  market  as  frictionless 
competitive market, and the modern approach where the housing market is characterized 
by frictions and imperfections. Quite naturally, the policy recommendations will be quite 
different,  ranging  from  little  government  intervention  to  much  more  intervention  and 
interactions  between  different  markets.  In  Section  2.2,  we  will  develop  our  second 
theoretical issue: the pros and cons of renting versus owning. The debate is relatively 
complicated  and  we  will  investigate  the  main  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
homeownership. 
Because housing policy in China is complex, in Section 3, we would like to see 
what can be learned from housing policies in other countries (especially in the United 
States, Europe, and Asia). We will see that different countries have different policies but 
that the same general trends in urban housing are common. One aspect that will retain our 
attention will be social housing. The latter has been an important part of housing policies, 
especially in Europe. For example, it culminated in England in 1979 where it represented 
31 percent of the total English housing stock (Hills, 2007, p. 43). We will then examine 
what has worked and not worked with respect to housing policies in the US, Europe, and 
Asia. 
Section 4 is devoted to housing policy issues and options in China. We will first 
explain the different housing policies implemented in China, especially the recent ones 
(Section 4.1) and the specificity of the hukou system as well as its consequences in the 
housing and labor markets (Section 4.2). In Section 4.3, we will summarize what we have 
learned  from the theoretical mechanisms and the international experience in terms of 
housing policies. Finally, in Section 4.4, we will make some policy recommendations. 
We will first look at possible housing policies that may work and analyze what kinds of 
institutional arrangements can make things better. Then, we will analyze some alternative 
policies to public housing that can help improve access to affordable housing and reduce 
the spread of slums. 
 
  
2  Some theoretical considerations 
 
 




We  develop  different  arguments  concerning  the  pros  and  cons  of  government 
involvement in housing, differentiating between the “traditional view”, where the housing 
market is viewed as perfectly competitive, and the more “recent view” where the housing 
market  is  characterized  by  imperfect  competition  (i.e.,  asymmetric  information, 
transaction costs, search costs, externalities) and non-competition (due to the thinness of 
both households and housing units in characteristic space, as well as mobility costs on 




2.1.1  The traditional view 
 
In  almost  all  housing  policy  debates,  economists  argue  for  less  government 
intervention in the housing sector than other groups of experts. Most economists believe 
that markets work reasonably efficient and argue for government intervention to oil the 
wheels  of  the  market  mechanism.  The  main  argument  is  that  the  principal  role  of 
government with respect to housing should be to enable housing markets to work. 
There  are  circumstances  where  competitive  markets  will  not  work:  natural 
monopoly  (increasing  returns  to  scale),  externalities,  and  public  goods.  Government 
intervention may be justified on efficiency grounds to deal with each. The government 
should also intervene if equity and social justice can be achieved through the lump-sum 
redistribution of income. 
Since natural monopoly and public goods are unimportant in the housing sector, 
and  since  housing-related  externalities  can  be  dealt  with  on  a  piecemeal  basis  (for 
example,  most  land  use  externalities  are  dealt  with  via  zoning,  and  social  capital 
externalities  partially  through  the  subsidization  of  homeownership),  adherents  of  the 
classic  market  failure  view  of  the  role  of  government  argue  for  limited  government 
intervention in the housing market to improve efficiency, and income transfers rather 
than housing assistance to improve equity.   
Thus,  if  we  consider  that  housing  is  characterized  by  a  perfect  frictionless 
competitive market, with the exception of neighborhood externalities, housing markets 




                                                 
2 I’m following here some arguments made by Arnott (2009), 2.1.2  The more recent view 
 
There is a more recent view based on the theory of optimal economic policy under 
imperfect  information  and  frictions  (see,  in  particular,  Arnott,  1987,  1989,  2009; 
Wheaton, 1990; Read, 1997). The housing sector is particularly affected by these issues 
since transaction costs are large (in particular, search costs, moving costs, and transaction 
fees) and informational asymmetries are important (e.g., potential occupants are not fully 
aware of each housing unit’s characteristics, and landlord and tenant do not know each 
other’s traits). In the previous discussion (“the traditional view”), efficiency was achieved 
by correcting market failures and equity via lump-sum redistribution. However, lump-
sum redistribution is feasible if the government could observe need directly, but it cannot 
in reality, and instead must imperfectly infer need on the basis of what it can observe. In 
that case, first-best policies cannot be achieved and second-best policies (when there are 
some  unalterable  constraints  that  preclude  attainment  of  the  first  best)  have  to  be 
implemented. 
Since  the  menu  of  second-best  redistributive  policies  might  include  housing 
subsidy programs, consideration of asymmetric information provides a potential basis for 
an expanded role of government in the housing sector, beyond correcting for the classic 
market failures.  
More generally, if one considers the housing market as being characterized by 
imperfect  competition  and  frictions  resulting  from  search  costs,  mobility  costs,  and 
contractual  incompleteness,  then  a  central  question  is  how  housing  markets  actually 
achieve coordination in the absence of a Walrasian auctioneer, given all the particularities 
of housing (immobility, durability, heterogeneity, etc.). Stimulated by advances in the 
theory  of  imperfect  information,  incomplete  contracts,  optimal  search  and  matching 
markets,  this  strand  of  research  ‘took  off’  in  the  eighties  and  has  made  substantial 
advances since then (Quigley, 1997; Hubert, 2006; Arnott, 2009). This literature deals 
with a broad range of issues, e.g., the role of real estate agents, the purpose of the various 
features of rental contracts, the function of vacancy rates, optimal pricing strategies and 
search behavior, etc. This approach delivers a more realistic picture of the institutions and 
mechanisms  through  which  coordination  is  achieved  and  adds  a  cautious  note  with 
respect to the welfare properties of the housing market. Due to search and mobility cost, 
competition is imperfect even with a large number of agents on both sides of the market. 
Search  externalities  give  rise  to  vacancy  rates  which  deviate  from  first  best,  and 
incomplete  contracts  create  subtle  turnover  externalities.  Not  surprisingly,  the  policy 
implications tend to be richer than under perfect competition and perfect information. In 
principle,  efficiency  can  often  be  enhanced  through  appropriate  state  intervention, 
though practically the very same features which prevent the market from achieving first-
best efficiency make the desirability of government intervention moot. 
So the key question in terms of the welfare economics of housing policy is what 
level of government that should undertake it. The standard argument, deriving from the 
literature on fiscal federalism, is that the central government should undertake broad-
based redistributive policy since its doing so generates less welfare-induced migration 
and according to some standards is fairer. Contrary to this is the argument that local 
governments  are  better  informed  about  local  conditions  and  are  better  able  to  judge 
which  households  are  the  most  needy.  In  the  United  States,  broad-based  housing programs are set up and funded by the central government but are administered at the 
local level. 
Finally, much of the literature on housing policy overlooks spatial aspects. Where a 
household  lives  determines  its  access  to  public  services,  including  education,  as  well  as 
neighborhood quality. A housing program that is otherwise well designed may lead to its 
beneficiaries  being  socially  isolated  and  having  poor  access  to  job  opportunities.
3  More 
generally,  housing  policy  can  have  long-term  effects  on  the  spatial  structure  of  cities, 
influencing especially the social composition of neighborhoods. 
Since almost all housing market policies are targeted either on renters or on a 
particular  class  of  owners,  it  is  important  for  sound  policy  analysis  to  have  a  good 
understanding of tenure choice. This is what is studied in the next section.  
 
2.2  Pros and cons of renting versus owning 
 
The  discussion thus  far  has  tended  to  treat housing  policy  in  the  abstract.  As 
stated  above,  most  actual  housing  policies  are  targeted  towards  either  renters  or 
homeowners, and are directed at either the supply side or the demand side of the market. 
Governments almost everywhere favor homeownership (see Section 3 below) due to the 
perception that it fosters social stability,  even though homeownership  for the poor is 
highly risky, as the recent rapid rise in US sub-prime foreclosures has shown. Since the 
bulk of poor households are renters, redistributive housing policies should be directed 
primarily at the rental housing market.  
Recent housing policy experience in developed countries indicates that demand-
side, income-related housing subsidy programs (such as housing subsidies and housing 
vouchers) are generally more effective in getting decent and affordable housing to the 
needy than public housing and other supply-side programs (Olsen, 2003). The current 
majority view, based on numerous empirical studies, many of which are reviewed in 
Olsen  (2003),  is  that  demand-side,  income-related  rental  assistance  policies  are  more 
efficient than supply-side rental assistance policies, according to a variety of criteria. 
Let us now be more precise. There are two fundamental characteristics associated 
with homeownership that distinguish renting and owning residents.
4  
The  first  bundle  of  attributes  is  the  set  of  property  rights  associated  with 
ownership. Because homeownership received generally a favorable treatment in tax laws 
(both in the US, Europe and Asia), renters possess an incentive to become homeowners 
sooner  than  their  economic  status  might  indicate,  which  generate  impacts  on  the 
household’s labor supply (i.e. it increases both participation and hours worked; see e.g., 
Haurin et al., 1996), wealth, fertility, investment risk, and mobility. Indeed, the desire to 
change tenure from renting to owning requires a household to overcome mortgage lender 
constraints, which means that a household may change behaviors such that its rate of 
savings and labor force participation prior to purchasing a home (see, e.g., Brueckner, 
1986; Engelhardt, 1994; Jones, 1995). Because homeowners have much of their wealth 
invested in housing, they generally have more investment risk (as the recent crisis has 
shown) due to a less diversified portfolio.  
                                                 
3 We discuss below the literature on spatial mismatch (Kain, 1968), which explores the consequences in the labor 
market for ethnic minorities to be physically isolated from jobs. 
4 For a survey, see Dietz and Haurin (2003). Homeownership also differs fundamentally from renting in that the transaction 
costs associated with securing and vacating the dwelling are significantly greater (before 
and after the home purchase). This also implies that owners are less mobile than renters. 
One of the clear consensus that emerges in this literature is that homeowners are 
less mobile than renting households (see, e.g. Quigley, 1997; Dietz and Haurin, 2003)
5 
due to higher transaction costs and because of greater ties to their neighborhood and 
community.  This  has  an  impact  in  the  labor  market  since  lower  residential  mobility 
implies more risky behavior in the labor market. For example, as we will show below for 
the case of Europe, if a region is not diversified in terms of jobs it offers (for example, 
mining in the North of England in the 1970s) and this region is strongly hit by a negative 
shock, then the lack of mobility of homeowners will result in high unemployment rate in 
this region. There is strong evidence on this issue, at least at a regional level (see, in 
particular,  Oswald, 1999a,b). Using simple regressions, Oswald  finds that a ten-point 
increase in homeownership produces a two-point in unemployment for the UK regions 
and the US states.
6 He speculates that, in 1990, almost half of industrialized nations’ 
unemployment was due to high levels of homeownership. It is difficult to postulate a 
causal relationship but a strong correlation does exist. In Europe, home ownership for the 
poor is often linked to social housing. However, as noted by Hughes and Mc Cormick 
(1987), this prevents even more residential mobility because owning a council house for a 
poor household means that it will never move since, in that case, it will lose its right and 
will not be able to obtain a council house in another region. 
Homeownership has also been linked to urban sprawl (Brueckner, 2000) since 
people that move to suburbs are often whites and homeowners. This also has an impact 
on poverty and difficult job access for ethnic minorities since jobs tend to follow people 
(Hoogstra et al, 2010), which increases the distance between where ethnic minorities live 
and  where  jobs  are  (Kain,  1968).  For  example,  South  and  Crowder  (1997)  find  that 
homeownership in the US significantly reduced the likelihood of a household relocating 
from  a  distressed  neighborhood.  Also,  African  Americans  have  a  dramatically  lower 
ownership rate, which reflects restricted choice in the housing market (Charles and Hurst, 
2002). There is agreement that the primary determinant of the spatial extension of cities 
is increased demand for more housing in the form of larger homes and lots (Brueckner, 
2000). Since owner-occupied dwellings are generally larger and have larger lots than 
rental  units,  there  is  positive  relationship  between  homeownership  and  urban  sprawl. 
Urban sprawl is clearly inefficient from an economic viewpoint (Brueckner, 2000).    
 
3  Housing policies in the United States, Europe, 
and Asia  
Throughout Western Europe, as elsewhere in the world (especially the US and 
Asia), housing policy reflects the political ideology of the government in power. Despite 
considerable variations  in the  aims  and  objectives  of  housing  policy  from country  to 
another, governments “right of center” generally tend to favor less state intervention, give 
only  limited  support  to  the  social-rented  sector,  and  promote  owner  occupation  and 
                                                 
5 The sense of causality is not clear since people with long-term horizons are more likely to choose homeownership. 
6 For the US, this result has been questioned. See, in particular, Green and Hendershott (2001). private landlordism. Governments to the  “left of center” normally accept the need to 
intervene in the market, give responsibilities and funds to local authorities and non-profit 
housing  organizations  to  enable  them  to  provide  affordable  housing,  and  attempt  to 
ensure that housing resources are distributed fairly equitably across and within tenures.  
We  will  now  expose  the  different  housing  policies  implemented  in  the  US, 
Europe and Asia. Having in mind the theoretical arguments of Section 2, we will try to 
evaluate the pros and cons of these policies.  
 
 
3.1  The US experience
7  
 
Let us give some interesting facts about housing in the United States. America’s 
poor are concentrated in rental housing. Among the 15.12 million poor households in 
America  in  2005,  57.4  percent  were  renters  and  only  8.6  percent  of  owner-occupant 
households were poor (Census Bureau, 2005). Also in 2005, the median income among 
renter households was $27,051 while it was $55,571 among owner-occupant households 
(Census Bureau, 2005). Housing is the single largest  expense in the budgets of both 
renters  and  owners.  According  to  the  Consumer  Expenditure  Survey  for  2005, 
homeowners spend on average 31.9 percent of all consumer spending and 35.6 percent 
for  renters.  Renter  households  tend  to  be  concentrated  in  central  cities  while  owner-
occupant  households  are  more  prevalent  in  suburbs.  Despite  these  facts,  the  federal 
government’s  housing-related  policies  strongly  favor  homeowners  over  renters,  as 
allocated by its allocation of financial benefits between those groups.  
In  this  section,  we  will  describe  the  two  main  types  of  housing  policies 
implemented  in  the  US  (those  targeted  towards  home  ownership  and  those  targeting 
directly low-income households) and then expose the remaining problems and challenges 
for the future.    
 
3.1.1  US housing policies 
 
Let us start by describing the policies encouraging homeownership. Federal, state 
and local governments in the United States subsidize household investment in owner-
occupied housing. The portfolio of policies includes the non-taxation of imputed rents, 
favorable tax treatment of capital gains, local land-use restrictions, exemption of housing 
from means-tested social insurance programs, subsidized mortgage insurance, and the 
sponsorship of secondary mortgage-market enterprises (Jaffee and Quigley, 2007). 
The most significant housing subsidy programs in the U.S. are funded by tax 
expenditures through the Internal Revenue Code. The special status of owner-occupied 
housing  under  the  personal  income  tax  is  well-known:  interest  payments  for  home 
mortgages  are  deductible  as  personal  expenses  for  the  first  and  second  homes  of 
taxpayers, up to a limit of one million dollars; ad valorem property taxes on owner-
occupied houses are also deductible as personal expenses; the implicit rental income from 
                                                 
7 I cannot present all the possible housing policies in the United States; there are just too many. For an overview of 
these policies, see Schwartz (2006). See also Olsen (2003) and Green and Malpezzi (2003) who provide expert reviews 
of the current state of housing policy in the United States, as well as some of its history. occupying the house (the “dividend”) is excluded from gross income; and capital gains 
are essentially untaxed.
8 
Beyond these subsidies to home ownership, which apply to all owner–occupants, 
the U.S. tax code provides additional subsidies to specific groups of homeowners. These 
programs  are  managed  by  the  states,  but  the  source  of  the  subsidy  is  federal  tax 
expenditures. The tax code permits lower levels of government to issue tax-exempt debt 
and to use the proceeds for the benefit of specific mortgage holders through the Mortgage 
Revenue Bond (MRB) program. Recipients benefit by obtaining mortgages which have 
been issued at the lower tax-exempt interest rate, rather than the market rate.  
Let us now describe the policies directly targeting low-income households. Tax 
deductions of housing expenses are an important proportion of fiscal expenses in many 
countries. These deductions are often based on equity reasons as it is considered that they 
are useful to help  many households to afford a house to live in.  For example, in its 
preamble to the 1949 Housing Act, Congress declared its goal of “a decent home in a 
suitable living environment for every American family.” In the more than 50 years since 
this legislation was passed, the federal government has helped fund the construction and 
rehabilitation  of  more  than  5  million  housing  units  for  low-income  households  and 
provided rental vouchers to nearly 2 million additional families (Schwartz, 2006). Yet, 
the nation’s housing problems remain acute.  In 2003, 46 million households lived in 
physically deficient housing, spent 30 percent or more of their income on housing, or 
were homeless (National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2005) 
Excluding tax expenditures, the federal government provides subsidies for low-
income households in three basic ways: (i) supporting the construction and operation of 
specific housing developments; (ii) helping renters pay for privately owned housing; and 
(iii) providing states and localities with funds to develop their housing programs.
9 
(i) Supporting the construction and operation of specific housing developments: 
These policies are known as supply-side or project based subsidies and include public 
housing and several other programs, such as Section 8 New Construction, in which the 
federal  government  helps  subsidize  the  construction  and  sometimes  the  operation 
privately  owned  low-income  housing.  The  aim  is  to  “remedy  the  acute  shortage”  of 
decent  housing  through  a  federally  financed  construction  program  that  sought  to 
eliminate  “substandard  and  other  inadequate  housing.”  The  low-income  housing  tax 
credit (LIHTC) program was authorized by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to provide direct 
subsidies for the construction or acquisition of new or substantially rehabilitated rental 
housing for occupancy by lower-income households. Through 2003, the tax credit has 
helped fund the development of more than 1.2 million housing units. 
(ii)  Helping  renters  pay  for  privately  owned  housing:  This  has  become  the 
dominant form of low-income housing assistance. The government provides low-income 
households with vouchers. Households in possession of vouchers receive the difference 
between the fair market rent in a locality—the median rent, estimated regularly for each 
metropolitan area by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)—and 
30 percent of their income. Households in possession of a voucher may choose to pay 
                                                 
8 Many  other  developed countries also provide preferential treatment of homeownership through their systems of 
national taxation (see Englund, 2003, for an international comparison, and the next sections).  
 
9 For an overview and historical perspectives of the programs, see Jafee and Quigley (2007). more than  the  fair  market  rent  for  any  particular  dwelling, up  to  40 percent of  their 
income, making up the difference themselves. They may also pocket the difference if 
they can rent a HUD approved dwelling for less than the fair market rent.  
(iii) Providing states and localities with funds to develop their housing programs: 
These policies consist of block grants that fund housing programs crafted by state and 
local governments. States and localities usually receive block grants on a formula basis 
and have the latitude to use the funds for a wide range of purposes. The oldest and largest 
block grant program, the Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) gives states 
and localities the most discretion in determining how funds may be used.   
 
3.1.2  Major unsolved issues and challenges for the future  
 
Even though the United States has spent millions of dollars on housing policy, 
three major issues are still unsolved (Retsinas and Belsky, 2008): 
(1) The incomes of millions of American households are too low for them to pay 
for adequate rental shelter. They have to devote so much of their incomes to housing that 
they cannot afford other necessities, such as health care, transportation, education and 
food.  Here  two  problems  can  be  identified:  Wages  of  low-skill  workers  are  too  low 
and/or housing prices are too high. Direct subsidies (either in terms of wages or housing) 
for poor renters could be implemented to solve this issue but would cost a lot of money, 
which is very unlikely given the present situation. 
(2) Federal housing-related policies are mainly based upon the political popularity 
of homeownership and not upon the intensity of housing needs among households, even 
though it is renter households that need housing assistance most acutely. In theory, the 
government  could  change  its  policy  and  spend  more  money  on  renters  than  home 
ownership.  As  Quigley  (2008)  suggested,  money  directed  to  high-income 
homeownership  could  be  directed  to  housing  vouchers  and  other  subsidies  for  renter 
households. 
(3) Areas of high poverty, crime, drug abuse, unemployment, etc. combine low-
quality public schools and lack of health care that make living in such areas very difficult 
and much more harmful than living in most-middle income neighborhoods. Moreover, 
most  American  suburbs  are  politically  dominated  by  home-owning  majorities,  who 
pressure local governments to maintain regulatory barriers against local construction of 
low-cost single family homes or any rental apartments at all. This makes difficult for 
low-income  households  to  move  out  concentrated  poverty  areas  into  richer  suburbs, 
where they could easily obtain good jobs and good schools for their children (literature 
on spatial mismatch, urban blight, etc.). This is a major blow of the housing policy in the 
United States. We have discussed some of these issues in Section 2.2.  
Some policies have tried to address these problems but with limited success. Let 
us describe them. 
An interesting policy aiming at fighting against poverty has been implemented in 
the US since the 1960’s and is called the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) Program. Its aim 
is to promote the chances in life for young people in segregated areas. The programs have 
been implemented in large cities like Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York and 
mean that families in areas with high unemployment and poverty are given the possibility 
of moving to areas with a higher level of gainful employment and education as well as better schools and education. The program is optional and covers families that live in an 
area where more than 40 percent of the population are defined as poor. The government 
covers the additional cost that emerges when the family is to change from cheaper to 
more expensive housing. The results of most MTO programs (in particular for Baltimore, 
Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York) show a clear improvement in the well-
being of participants and a reduction in criminality but have little effect on education and 
employment (see, in particular, Ladd and Ludwig, 2001; Katz et al., 2001; Ludwig, et., 
2001; Rosenbaum and Harris, 2001; Kling and Katz, 2005). One interesting argument 
advanced  by  Quigley  and  Raphael  (2008)  is  that  the  effects  on  education  and 
employment are small because the MTO programs move people (mainly blacks) from 
very poor areas to poor areas. In particular, the treatment (that is, the exposure to new 
neighborhoods)  falls  far  short  of  moving  experimental  subjects  to  neighborhoods 
comparable to those of the average poor white resident in metropolitan areas. 
Another interesting policy implemented in the United States (but also in the UK 
and France; see Zenou, 2009a) is the “Enterprise Zone” (EZ) program, which aim is to 
revitalize depressed local areas by tempting firms to become established in segregated 
areas. Politicians identify all depressed areas with certain characteristics such as: high 
unemployment,  considerable  poverty,  a  high  level  of  criminality,  a  large  number  of 
young people without education. All firms that become established in these areas are 
exempt from tax (pay-rolls taxes) during a certain period (typically five years). The idea 
of this policy is to decrease the “distance” (both physical and social) between people 
living in these areas and firms by helping them enter the labor market. In return, each 
firm must hire a certain fraction of their employees from the local population (this varies 
from state to state). The effects of this policy on employment are mixed and rather small 
(see e.g., Papke, 1994; Boarnet and Bogart, 1996; Bondonio and Engberg, 2000, 2007; 
Busso and Kline, 2009; for a review, see Peters and Fisher, 2002).  
As stated above, programs like the MTO and EZ have had only small effects. The 
key question is whether we should help people to move out poor areas (such as in MTO 
programs) or should we, on the contrary, improve poor neighborhoods (such as the EZ 
programs).
10  In  other  words,  do  we  want  people-oriented  or  place-oriented  policies? 
There  is  no  simple  answer  but  we  believe  that  these  two  types  of  policies  are 
complementary and should implement together.  
Finally,  because  it  is  difficult  for  minorities  to  live  in  the  suburbs,  Katz  and 
Turner  (2008)  have  suggested  that  the  federal  government  should  create  substantial 
financial incentives for state government to pressure local governments to reduce barriers 
to more affordable housing, especially in the suburbs.
11 But this has been done in the past 
without success. The problem is much more complex and it is not sure that housing 
policies by themselves could solve this very complicated issue. Combined housing and 
labor policies such as the Enterprise zone program could be effective if implemented 
correctly. We will further discuss these issues in Section 4 below. 
 
                                                 
10 As noted by Rosenthal (2008), a fundamental difference between now-construction and voucher-type programs is 
their effect on where the poor can live. With public housing and Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) programs, 
an important fraction of the low-income housing stock will be found within a city and these programs will tend to 
concentrate the poor. By definition, voucher-type policies do the opposite since they help households to leave poor 
neighborhoods and usually to move in the suburbs. 
11 Some of this gets mixed up with local tax policy. 3.2  The European experience 
 
Contrary to the United States, there is no common housing policy at the European 
(federal) level since, formally, the European Union (EU) is not legally empowered to 
make housing policy; competence in the area of housing policy is held by individual 
member  states.
12  In  most  European  countries,  however,  there  is  a  mixture  of  many 
interventions,  but  three  pillars  of  housing  policies  in  Europe  can  be  put  forward:  (i) 
promote home ownership, (ii) construction of public housing, (iii) direct rental subsidies 
to  households,  especially  low-income  households.  In  some  sense,  these  policies  are 
relatively similar to those implemented in the United States (see Section 3.1).  
 
3.2.1  Housing policies in Europe
13 
 
(i) Home ownership 
 
This is the most popular housing policy that has been implemented in Europe for 
the  last  decades. There  are,  however,  very  large  differences  between  countries.
14  For 
example, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom are a very diverse group of countries –
demographically, economically, socially, politically, but, in each of these countries, and 
for different reasons, owner occupations is the dominant tenure.
15 Interestingly, the US 
home  ownership  sector  is  relatively  smaller  than  that  some  European  countries  like 
Ireland,  Spain,  and  the  United  Kingdom  but  much  larger  than  Hungary  for  example 
(Scanlon and Whitehead, 2004). If we, for example, compare  France and the US, then 
one can see that homeownership is more developed in the US where 68 % of households 
own their dwellings, versus 56 % in France (in 2001). Perhaps more importantly, the 
proportion of mortgage holders among owners is also much higher (62 %) in the US, than 
in France (38 %).
16 In most of the European countries, owner-occupied housing as been 
vigorously promoted by government through the provision of subsidies and mortgage-tax 
reliefs. 
(ii) Public and social housing  
 
Public  and  social  housing  are  a  much  more  important  part  of  the  European 
housing policies, with council housing in the UK, HLM in France, etc. There are also 
very large variations between European countries. The social rented housing stock is 
proportionally larger in the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria than in the EU in aggregate. 
Although  in  France  the  sector  is  marginally  smaller  than  the  EU  average,  the  social 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, there is a relatively recently published report (November 2004), called the Kok report (after Wim Kok, 
former Prime Minister of the Netherlands), which focuses on growth of economies and jobs in the EU, that contains 
statements about desirable housing outcomes. This report promotes a Europe with higher levels of home ownership and 
also higher levels of private renting with reduced levels of social housing (Doling, 2006). 
 
13 A good overview of the housing policy in Europe can be found in Bachin (1996) 
14 See, in particular, Englund (2003) for a comparison of homeownership and taxes between different countries in 
Europe. 
15 For example, programs like “Mortgage Tax Relief” and “Right to Buy” in the UK (Gibb and Whitehead, 2007) are 
typical programs promoting home ownership. 
16 See Table 10.1 in Laferrère and Le Blanc (2006). rented stock has experienced substantial growth in recent years as a result of proactive 
governmental and institutional policy.  If we look at the different European countries, 
which differ considerably in term of size and demography, and in their economic, social 
and political backgrounds, we can observe that each country has  experienced serious 
housing  shortages  after  the  Second  World  War,  and  each  to  a  significant  extent  has 
looked to the social-rented sector to satisfy its housing needs.
17 
While the Netherlands has the largest proportion of social rented housing in the 
EU, 36 percent in 1994 compared to an EU average of 18 percent (Balchin, 1996), in 
Spain it is quasi non-existent. Spain is a typical example of a European country where 
government policies have favored home ownership at the expense of social housing. This 
has totally changed the picture of housing in this country (Eastaway and Varo, 2002). In 
1950,  the percentage  of  dwellings  to be  rented  was higher than  the  one  representing 
houses in ownership (see Table 1). However, the sharp downward trend in the rental 
sector jointly with the upward evolution of owner-occupation had completely changed 
the scene at the end of the 1990s. 
 
Table 1. Tenure patterns of main residences in Spain, 1950-95 (percentages) 
  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  1995 
Social rented housing  3 
 
2  2  2  1  1 
Private rented 
housing 
51  43  30  21  15  13 
 
Total rented housing  54  45  32  23  16  14 
 
Owner-occupation  46  51  64  73  78  81 
 
Others  0  4  4  4  6  5 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: Eastaway and Varo (2002) 
 
(iii) Direct rental subsidies to low-income households 
 
Housing consumption and investment remain subsidized even in the most liberal 
countries. In 2001 the US spent 1.54 % of GDP, and France 1.74 % on public aid to 
housing (Laferrère and Le Blanc, 2006). Overall, in France in 2000, the amount spent on 
housing subsidies to private sector tenants was 5.3 billion Euros (Laferrère and Le Blanc, 
2004). This is by no account a small figure. In January 1992, a law passed in France 
which extended rental assistance to all low-income households, including students. The 
subsidy  is  thus  a  universal  means-tested  allowance.  There  were  1.9  million  assisted 
private sector tenants in 1990, which represented a third of all private sector tenants and 
3.1 million in 1997, representing half of private sector tenants (Laferrère and Le Blanc, 
2004). The proportion of assisted tenants is large, compared to most countries. In the US, 
housing allowances have been available for low-income private sector tenants since 1974. 
Some 13% of American renters are assisted and about half of them get an allowance 
close to the French type (the so-called Section 8 certificates and vouchers). The main 
                                                 
17 Whereas housing subsidies normally involve transfer payments from tax payers to the producers or consumers of 
housing, rent control results in a transfer of payment from landlords to tenants representing the difference between 
market rents and controlled rents, and is thus also a subsidy. Social housing is typically a rent control. difference is that while all French eligible households receive an allowance, there exist 
quotas of vouchers in the US, and it is estimated that only a third of eligible households 
receive them (Olsen, 2003). In other words, in the French system, housing subsidies are 
an entitlement. Even if we have focused on France, most European countries have similar 
policies in terms of subsidizing housing to low-income households. 
 
3.2.2  Evaluation of housing policies in Europe 
 
Let us evaluate the different housing policies in Europe. We have seen that there 
is a large home ownership sector in European countries, often larger than that of the US 
in many countries. 
The first problem is that home ownership has been encouraged by the different 
European government at the expense of social renting so that there has been an increased 
degree of polarization between owner-occupation and social renting (see, e.g. Table 1 
above for Spain). The problem of how to deal with the more deprived components of 
housing demand has remained largely unsolved. As a result, poverty and deprived areas 
have increased over time and has become a real problem in Europe, especially with the 
large influx of immigrants in the last three decades who tend to live in segregated areas 
(Bisin et al., 2009). The private-rented stock, meanwhile, has also decreased in scale (in 
part because of rent control but also through unfavorable tax treatment and investment 
returns). 
The second problem is that homeownership is not always good for the economy. 
As stated in Section 2.2, Oswald (1999a, 1999b) has identified a significant statistical 
correlation  between  rates  of  home  ownership  and  rates  of  unemployment  in 
economically advanced countries. In commenting on this, Oswald asserted that there was 
a causal mechanism – higher rates of home ownership increased unemployment rates – 
that  occurred  because  home  owners  are  relatively  immobile.  There  are  two  main 
components of this. The first is transaction costs, which vary widely from one European 
country to another, but in general are considerable, running to thousands and in some 
cases tens of thousands of Euros (Coogan, 1998). Oswald recognized a second possible 
curb on the mobility of home owners, that immobility could be the result of the high costs 
of housing, relative to incomes, making it difficult for people, particularly young and 
unemployed, to move away from the parental home. 
Like home ownership, social housing is not good for labor mobility. Critics of 
rent controls (or social housing) argue that it leads to a sub-optimal use of dwellings and 
reduces  the  mobility  of  labor.  Indeed,  an important  aspect  of the  social  provision  of 
housing is that the output is allocated to households by administrative rather than market 
mechanisms. As a result, much of the literature relating mobility to tenure has tended to 
identify the bureaucratic procedures of social housing and rent control as being the major 
cause of inertia in the housing market (see Minford et al., 1987; Hughes and McCormick, 
1987,  1990).  In  particular,  Hughes  and  McCormick  (1987,  1990)  have  examined 
migration  behavior  and  compared  outcomes  between  council  tenants  and  equivalent 
owner-occupiers in the US and the UK. They show that council house tenants tend to 
migrate less often than those in the market sector and when they do move it is likely to be for housing rather than labor-market reasons.
18 More generally, administrative allocation, 
rent  controls  and  subsidies  to  owner  occupation  are  all  shown  adversely  affect  the 
operation of the labor market (Bover et al., 1989). 
Other  researchers  have  stressed  the  advantages  of  private  rental  housing  in 
providing easy and quick access, leading to the suggestion that more renting and less 
ownership would, from an economic growth perspective, be a preferred option. 
In sum, in view of the potential importance of the rental sector for labor mobility 
and for the efficient, overall functioning of the housing market, the bias of tax relief and 
subsidies in favor of owner-occupation should be re-considered in Europe, particularly in 
countries where the share of the rental sector has fallen to very low levels (see Table 2) 
 
Table 2. Housing in Europe 
 
      Rent 













Germany  35.55  42  58  83  17 
Denmark  2.43  50  44  42  41 
France  27.81  54  39  52  44 
Italy  25.03  79  18  70  23 
UK  23.71  65  35  29  71 
Spain  18.26  78  14  92  8 
Source: European Commission (1998) 
 
 
There are, however, important differences between the European and American 
housing policies. As noted by Whitehead (1999), in Europe, housing has been seen as a 
fundamental  part  of  national  social  policy  while,  in  the  United  States,  most  housing 
policies (for example, rent control, dwelling-based taxation, housing assistance to low-
income families, zoning, etc.) are fundamentally local policies. As a result, evaluating 
European policies can be done by comparing different country experiences while, in the 
US, comparison across areas is more relevant. 
 
 
3.3  The Asian experience
19 
 
While Singapore is not generally regarded as a welfare state, the provision of 
housing welfare on a large scale has been a defining feature of its welfare system. The 
extensive housing system has played a useful role in raising savings and homeownership 
rates  as  well  as  contributing  to  sustained  economic  growth.  Few  would  dispute  the 
description  of  Singapore’s  housing  policies  as  “phenomenally  successful”  (Ramesh, 
2003). Singapore’s economic growth record in the past four decades has brought it from 
                                                 
18 The social housing sector has been developed in England in the 1960s and 1970s where it peaked at 31 percent of the 
total English housing stock in 1979 (Hills, 2007, p. 43). After this period, social housing has declined in England 
because of the “right-to-buy” scheme introduced by Margaret Thatcher in 1986 and the public spending cuts on new 
constructions (Hills, 2007) to reach 18.5 percent of the stock in 2004. 
19 An overview can be found in Groves et al. (2007). third  world  to  first  world  status,  with  home-ownership  widespread  at  more  than  90 
percent for the resident population. Singapore has 4.2 million people and a land area of 
only 697 square kilometers. While housing loans per GDP constituted 4 percent in 1970 
it reached 64 percent in 2000 (Phang, 2007). As in most countries, there were different 
phases  in  the  post-war  housing  policies:  (1)  Building  shortages  (1947-1979);  (2) 
Deregulation and creation of resale market (1979-1990); (3) Financial liberalization and 
housing  price  inflation;  (4)  Excess  housing  stock  (1998-present).
20  To  summarize, 
Singapore policy relies on compulsory savings, state-land ownership, and state provision 
of housing and an extensive public sector.  
Hong Kong has a total land area of 1,097 square kilometres, among which 83 
percent  is  non  built  up  land  and  only  5.3  percent  is  residential  built  up  area.  Social 
housing has provided a safety net for the poor in Hong  Kong.  It combines this with 
clearance of illegal squatter huts. Two main policies: (1) Housing Subsidy Policy (HSP) 
(introduced in 1987 and revised in 1993) and the Safeguarding the Rational Allocation of 
Public Housing Resources (SRA) policy (implemented in 1997 and revised in 1999), and 
(2) the Comprehensive Means Test (CMT) policy, which deals with all the prospective 
tenants of public rental housing. Without the involvement of the Hong Kong Housing 
Authority (HKHA) in the redevelopment process of older public rental housing estates, 
the  improvement  in  housing  conditions,  landscape  and  spatial  distribution  of  modern 
housing estates would have been impossible. 
Even  if  social  housing  policies  have  worked  relatively  well  in  Singapore  and 
Hong Kong, their applicability to China is difficult because of the very specificity of 
these countries in terms size, population, etc. As a result, we will now look at larger 
Asian countries, more similar to China.  
Since 1998, when south Korea
21  was seriously affected by the Asian economic 
crisis, the Korean government has put special emphasis on the social safety net because 
of  a  great  increase  in  poverty  and  unemployment. In  its  housing  policy  in  2002, the 
Korean government for the first time established the Construction Plan for One Million 
Rental Housing Units from 2003-2012. The aim was to ensure a supply of good quality 
affordable rented housing for low-income families. Additionally, in 2004, the Korean 
government  establish  the  Korea  Housing  Finance  Corporation  to  promote  home 
ownership for low- and middle-income families by providing long term mortgages.
22   
The  main  pillar  of  housing  policy  in  Japan
23  is  to  encourage  the  building  of 
owner-occupied housing by means of GHLC (Government Housing Loan Corporation) 
loans. The interest rates on the subsidized loans are 2 to 3 percent lower than the market 
mortgage rate (Kanemoto, 1997). The amounts of subsidies involved in the GHLC loans 
are quite sizable. The GHLC loans are available also for rental housing construction, but 
subsidies involved are much smaller. The GHLC loans therefore favor owner-occupied 
housing over rental housing. National government expenditures on housing programs are 
                                                 
20 A major distinct characteristic of Singapore is the availability of retirement savings for private housing finance 
through Central Provident Fund (CPF). 
21 The population of South Korea in 2000 was 46 million inhabitants. Home ownership decreases from 71.7 percent in 
1970 to 54.2 percent in 2000 (see Park, 2007). 
22 To develop and improve poor areas, different housing regeneration programs have been implemented in South 
Korea (Ha, 2007). 
23 The population of Japan was 127,716 million in 2004, its land area, 377,899 km
2, and its home ownership constituted  
61.2 percent in 2003 while private rented houses: 26.8 percent in 2003 (see Hirayama, 2007) 1.4% of the total budget of the Japanese national government in 1993. This is close to 
that of the U.S. but lower than those of the U.K. and France and higher than that of 
Germany (see Table 10 in Kanemoto, 1997).
24 
The Japanese housing system, which concentrated public funds on middle-class 
families and encouraged them to purchase their own homes, generated a large disparity 
between those on low incomes and those with higher incomes; between single and family 
households; and between renters and home-owners. The government has neglected public 
housing. It is a two-tiered system where there has been generous support for middle-class 
groups  on  one  tier,  support  for  those  on  lower  incomes  has  become  increasingly 
residualized  and the target  group for the direct provision of public housing has been 
strictly limited on the second tier. The government created a system that defined home-
ownership as the social norm and placed public housing provision as a marginal measure.  
The housing sector in India
25 for several decades faced a number of set-backs, 
such  as  an  unorganized  market,  development  disparities,  a  compartmentalized 
development  approach  and  a  deterrent  rent  control  system.  There  was  not  even  a 
concerted attempt to understand the housing problem let alone promote it.  
The Government of India adopted a central planning model of development. The 
Planning Commission  of  India  is  the  central  think  tank which  prepares the  five  year 
plans.  These  plans
 
give  a  broad  direction regarding  the  policy  of  the  Government  of 
India. They also give the broad allocation of financial resources to various sectors of the 
economy. Based on the five year plans, annual plans are prepared by state governments 
for  implementation.  A  look  at  the  five  year  plans  reveals  the  manner  in  which  the 
Government of India had perceived the housing sector in the initial years and the manner 
in which it sees it now.  Financial allocation for housing as a percentage of the total 
investment in the economy was as high as 34 percent in the First Five Year Plan (1951-
56) but has now come down to as low as 2.4 percent in the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-
2007). As part of the Five Year Plans, the Government of India had launched various 
programs for providing housing to the people. 
The post 1990 period can be seen as the era of housing sector reforms. These 
reforms have overturned the situation to a great extent. The designing of a shelter policy, 
the  organization  of  the  housing  finance  market,  the  introduction  of  fiscal  incentives, 
increased public investment, legal reforms and others initiatives have brought about a 
number of changes in the housing sector (Mahadeva, 2006). Interestingly, these changes 
have been concerned with both reducing the housing shortage and increasing the number 
of quality housing stock besides increased access to various other housing amenities like 
safe drinking water, good sanitation and household electricity. But, at the same time, 
since these measures are in the process of taking roots and are in their infancy stages, the 
number of houseless people looking towards the state’s help are increasing, especially in 
backward and rural areas. Most social housing schemes, which have been in vogue for 
over 50 years, have yet to address the housing and amenities needs of the vulnerable 
groups. In the year 1981, there were 28 million slum dwellers in Indian cities and this 
number rose to 45 million by the year 1991. The number of slum dwellers in the year 
2001 was still at 40 million. As a percent of the urban population, the figures increased 
                                                 
24 The Japanese subsidy programs are mainly financed through national taxes on firms (Seko, 1994). 
25 India’s population is approximately 1.17 billion people (estimate for July, 2009) and consists of approximately one-
sixth of the world's population. from 17.5 percent in 1981 to 21.5 in 1991 and 22.8 in the year 2001 (Government of 
India, 1997, National Buildings Organisation, 2003) 
To  summarize,  it  seems  that  in  Asia,  especially  “large”  countries,  a  lot  of 
emphasize has been put on homeownership at the expense of social housing and aid to 
poor  households.  Because  of  the  different  crises  in  Asia,  this  has  created  a  poor 
population that has been neglected by government policies, especially housing. While 
Korea and India have tried to implement some social policies, Japan has mostly focused 
on middle- and high-income households, leaving behind the poor families. As a result, as 
in  Europe,  poverty  and  depressed  areas  have  sharply  increased  in  the  last  decade, 
especially after the financial crisis in 1998. 
 
 
4  Policy issues and some options for Chinese 
policy makers  
We would now like to draw some policy recommendations for housing in China 
based on the theoretical mechanisms highlighted in Section 2 and on the international 
experiences exposed in Section 3. Let us first describe the salient features of the housing 
policy in China. 
 
 
4.1  Housing policy in China 
 
Before 1949, most urban housing was private rental, provided by landlords. This 
was changed through a socialist transformation in the 1950s, in which the majority of 
properties  owned  by  big  landlords  where  nationalized.  Public  housing  were  built  by 
government owned enterprises and institutions (work units) and distributed directly to 
their employees as part of a comprehensive welfare provision system. Other elements in 
this welfare system include free education, health care, and pensions.  
The  first  important  housing  reforms  were  implemented  in  the  1980s  where  a 
public  housing  provision  system  was  established  in  all  cities  and  large  towns.  The 
housing reforms resumed in the early 1990s where house building was carried out by 
commercial developers rather than public sector employees. Housing privatization was a 
main element of these reform programs. By 2002, 80 percent of public housing has been 
sold  to  its  occupiers.  The  socialist  system  of  public  housing  and  welfare  support 
(supporting the idea of a universal housing benefit system provided through public sector 
employers) has given way progressively to a new system, which is market based and 
supports  home-ownership  (Lee,  2000).  To  be  more  precise,  this  new,  marked-based 
system focuses on two main areas: (i) support for home ownership for the middle- and 
high-income families through financial arrangements (i.e. housing provident fund system, 
mortgage  finance,  building  affordable  housing,  and housing  subsidy);  (ii) support  for 
low-income households through a remodelled social housing provision system. 
Indeed, with the introduction of the market economy, welfare services provided 
by employers were substantially reduced in order to improve production efficiency. Also, 
because of the market economy system, house prices started to soar in cities and the gap between  the  rich  and  the  poor  widened,  especially  in  cities.  The  housing  policies 
introduced in 1998 envisaged that about 5 percent of low-income urban families would 
rent  social  housing  (lianzu  fang)  from  the  municipal  government.  However,  its 
development  was  very  slowly  and  by  2003,  only  few  provinces  had  produced  local 
regulations for social housing. Furthermore, in most cities that implemented this policy, 
fewer  than  five  percent  of  households  actually  received  some  help.
26  One  of  the 
requirements for having access to social housing was that at least one member of the 
households must have local permanent non-agricultural hukou registration for more than 
five years.
27  
Subsidized  rental  housing  was  seen  by  many  local  officials  as  a  temporary 
measure to solve a short-run problem. However, with increasing unemployment and lack 
of social insurance, poverty became an issue and the number of households who actually 
need help was increasing rather than decreasing. In particular, a large fraction of poor 
living in cities are migrants who do not hold a hukou, and have thus almost no access to 
formal sector housing  market (which is intended to be 100% owner occupied), for a 
whole variety of reasons including no access to mortgages. As a result, migrants in cities 
mainly rent in the informal sector. 
The housing reform has led to the fact that the urban poor (most of them illegal 
migrants) have been marginalized into poor areas and locations while the rich and new 
middle class have emerged as the key players in the housing market. 
Although home-ownership and asset building is certainly a better approach than 
the socialist welfare provision, new problems have emerged, especially with the relative 
increase of the urban poor in cities.
28 Also, because housing building in the last ten years 
has been dominated by commercial property developers, new housing estates were built 
on different standards. This practice results in serious spatial segregation between the 
new and the old buildings,
29 and between the rich and the poor. 
Before  proposing  some  recommendations  that  could  alleviate  poverty  and 
segregation in China, we would like to expose one of the specificities of China: rural-
urban migration and the policies that have tried to limit this migration. This is unique to 
China.   
 
                                                 
26 In fact, most social housing has been sold rather than rented and often sold to non-poor households (i.e. typically 
above average incomes). 
27 Unlike most countries, China regulates internal migration. Public benefits, access to good quality housing, schools, 
health  care,  and  attractive  employment  opportunities  are  available  only  to  those  who  have  a  local  “Household 
Registration  System,”  also  called  “Hukou”.  Instituted  in  1958,  Hukou  requires  every  citizen  seeking  a  change  in 
residence to obtain permission from the public security bureau. Hukou is effectively an internal passport system that 
makes the process of moving between or within provinces analogous to the process of moving between countries. 
Coincident with the deepening of economic reforms, Hukou has gradually been relaxed since the 1980s, helping to 
explain  an  extraordinary  surge  of  migration  within  China.  We  explain  in  more  detail  the  hukou  system  and  its 
consequences in the next section. 
28 This increase is relative since, using the World Bank poverty line, income poverty rate in China of migrants is 5.4 
percent, urban residents 0.2 percent, and rural residents 10 percent. Furthermore, China has pulled about half a billion 
people out of poverty over past 25 years. 
 
29 Of course “old buildings” may be in potentially lovely heritage parts of the city that the Chinese government is 
anxious to tear down to “modernize” rather than gentrify the private market. 
 4.2  Rural-urban migration and the very specificity of the hukou system 
 
China’s very fast urbanization has induced a massive rural-urban migration since 
the late 1970s. According to official estimates, at the end of 2000, there were about 70 
million rural-urban migrants working and living in urban areas.
30 About 63 percent of 
rural migrants are employed in industry, construction, and service sectors in urban area, 
with  the  majority  of  them  being  self-employed  or  employed  by  privately  owned 
enterprises (Chan et al., 1999; Liu et al., 2003).   
Despite reduced constraints on rural labor mobility since the late 1970s and recent 
improvements  in  supporting  institutional  arrangements  on  migration  control,  rural 
migrants still encounter great difficulties in acquiring urban registration (urban hukou) 
and  permanent  residence  status  in  urban  areas  (Wang  and  Zuo,  1999).  Due  to  the 
incompleteness of the urban social service system reform, nearly all of those migrants are 
considered as being temporary in urban areas and thus do not have access to many urban 
amenities.  For  example,  it  remains  still  difficult  for  rural  migrants  to  access  urban 
housing (Chan and Zhang, 1999; Zhang et al., 2003; Wu 2004).  Zhang et al. (2003) and 
Wu (2004) summarize the main sources of rural migrants’ difficulties in accessing urban 
housing.  First, as we have seen in Section 4.1, the restructuring of the urban housing 
market since the reform is orientated to privatization and commercialization of housing 
(Song  et  al.,  2005).  Therefore,  newly  emerged  units  of  commercial  housing,  built 
essentially for making profit by real estate developers, are generally expensive and thus 
not affordable to migrants who are employed in low-paid jobs. Second, more affordable 
units provided by the secondary housing market where transactions of older housing units 
occur, or by subsidized public housing programs for the low-income families (known as 
the anju project) require a local urban hukou and are thus not available to rural migrants. 
As  a  result,  scholars  have  concluded  that  recent  reforms  in  urban  housing  provision 
overlooked  the  needs  of  rural  migrants  who  are  constrained  by  their  low  purchasing 
power and lack of urban hukou. 
Excluded from the urban housing system, many of the rural migrants reside in the 
urban villages where native farmers construct and rent out inexpensive housing units 
(Song et al., 2008). Through these villages, indigenous farmers are becoming well-off 
landlords by building extra rooms (Mobrand, 2006) and rural migrants are thus able to 
find shelter. Nonetheless, villages within cities are generally perceived as undesirable and 
consequently  dispelled  by  urban  authorities  because  of  the  villages’  association  with 
unplanned  land  uses,  decayed  housing  condition,  worsened  public  safety,  and 
deteriorated social order. Urban policies have been therefore adopted to demolish villages 
within cities and to redevelop them into commercialized housing districts. Neglecting 
millions of rural migrants residing urban villages, the debate on the adequate policies that 
should be adopted to redevelop the villages has been kept between urban authorities and 




                                                 
30 This number is now closer to 150 million (in 2010). 
 4.3  Lessons from theory and international experience 
 
Let us summarize what we have learned so far in terms of policies.  
 
(1) Should the government intervene in housing? 
 
The answer is clearly yes. Because of transaction costs and frictions, the housing market 
is clearly imperfect and no “invisible hand” will be able to restore efficiency through the 
market. In particular, the fact that poverty and segregation are rampant in most countries, 
including  China,  show  that  the  housing  market  is  not  functioning  well  and  the 
government  (at  the  local  and/or  national  level)  should  intervene  to  correct  these 
imperfections.  One  has  to  be,  however,  careful  with  the  types  of  interventions  the 
government can implement. The main issue is what incentives and education/information 
do governments need in order to intervene in a way that promotes greater equity and 
efficiency.  In  particular,  local  governments  in  China  have  no  incentives  to  invest  in 
human capital and reduce poverty since they are mainly evaluated on FDI, economic 
growth, physical capital, etc. 
 
(2) Should homeownership be encouraged? 
 
We have seen that policies encouraging homeownership (as in the US and Asia, and to 
some  extent  in  Europe)  mainly  favor  middle-  and  high-income  families,  often  at  the 
expense of poor families. We have also seen that the two main drawbacks of such a 
policy is that (i) it makes households more vulnerable to financial crises (such as the 
recent one), especially homeowners belonging to lower-income classes, because of the 
lack of diversity of their assets and (ii) it renders homeowners less mobile and therefore 
makes them more vulnerable to economic shocks and more likely to be unemployed. 
There  are  of  course  positive  aspects  of  homeownership  such  as  savings  incentives, 
positive  externalities,  social  capital,  etc.  (Dietz  and  Haurin,  2003).  It  would  seem, 
however, that the issue for urban China is to encourage, or permit a formal sector rental 
market. Right now renting in the formal sector is taxed and has been  in some cities 
“illegal”. 
 
(3) Should more social housing be developed? 
 
We  have  seen  that  there  has been  some tradeoff  between  homeownership and  social 
housing.  In  particular,  countries  (like  e.g.  Spain,  Japan,  and  even  China)  that  have 
subsidized homeownership tend to have neglected social housing. Social housing can be 
a good thing because it helps poor households live in cheap but decent housing and still 
have enough money left to spend on health and education. It has, however, two main 
drawbacks. First, it induced segregation and distance to jobs. Indeed, by putting together 
relatively poor families in areas generally located far away from jobs (this is true both in 
the US and in Europe), it reduces job opportunities for these households. These areas 
eventually become depressed and characterized by a large fraction of ethnic minorities, 
poor  quality  of  school,  high  unemployment  rates  and  high  level  of  crime.  The  large 
empirical  literature  on  spatial  mismatch  (Kain,  1968;  Ihlanfeldt  and  Sjoquist,  1998; Ihlanfeldt,  2006;  Zenou,  2009b)  has  shown  that:  (a)  poor  job  access  indeed  worsens 
labor-market outcomes, (b) black and Hispanic workers have worse access to jobs than 
white workers, and (c) racial differences in job access can explain between one-third and 
one-half  of  racial  differences  in  employment.  Second,  it  reduces  mobility  since  the 
entitlement of a social house located in a specific area is in general not transferrable to 
other areas. 
 
(4) Should the government directly subsidize poor households? 
 
Programs such as the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) implemented in the United States 
(see Section 3.1.2), which give housing vouchers to families that move from poor to 
richer areas, are directly targeted to poor families. The main advantage of such programs 
is that it reduced criminality and tends to give more opportunities to people. We have also 
seen  that  the  effects  on  employment  and  education  are  rather  small  because  these 
programs move people from very poor areas to poor areas. So to be successful these types 
of programs need either to move people from very poor areas to much richer areas and/or 
to be accompanied by other programs that revitalize poor areas, especially in rural areas. 
Regeneration policies or enterprise (empowerment) zone programs (both implemented in 
the US and in Europe) could be a good complementary solution to the MTO. 
 
(5) Are they alternative policies to housing that can help improve access to 
affordable housing and reduce the spread of slums? 
 
As stated above, we believe that regeneration policies or enterprise (empowerment) zone 
programs  could  be  a  good  alternative  policy  to  reduce  poverty  and  the  spread  of 
depressed areas (see Section 3.1.2). MTO and EZ programs are complementary policies 
since the former is a people-oriented policy while the later is place-oriented policy. 
  
4.4  Some options for China 
 
Can  we  apply  these  general  principles  (exposed  in  Section  4.3)  to  policy  reforms  in 
China?  It is clear  that  some  general  lessons  can  be  drawn  from the  theories and  the 
international experiences of other countries in terms of housing policies. However, as we 
have seen, China is very special country. In particular, (i) China has experienced very 
important changes in housing policies switching from a very centralized and planned 
policy to a much more market oriented one; (ii) China has a unique migration control 
with  the  hukou  system;  (iii)  Although  China  has  experienced  a  very  fast  and  large 
urbanization in the recent years, it is still under-urbanized and under-agglomerated (Au 
and Henderson, 2006a,b); (iv) China has a relative important informal housing rental 
sector  because  of  urban  villages  in  cities;  (v)  China  is  concerned  about  how  best  to 
address the problem of poverty and poor housing for migrant workers in urban areas. 
 
Here are different options that can be given based on what we have learned and the 
specificity of China. 
 
 (1) How should China fight against poverty in cities? 
 
One of the main concerns in Chinese cities is how best to address the problem of poverty 
mainly of “illegal” migrants (who are Chinese rural residents) living in “urban villages”. 
Furthermore,  some  local  urban  hukou  holders  are  also  poor--  the  lost  generation  in 
particular. We propose two steps to fight against this poverty. The first one is to require 
that  the  Chinese  government  recognizes  these  “illegal”  migrants  by  helping  them 
becoming “legal”. It is indeed difficult to implement a social housing policy fighting 
against poverty if the  government does not identify and recognize who are the poor. 
Second, social housing is mostly about subsidizing housing for the poor. To fight against 
poverty,  one  can  either  implement  place-targeted  policies  (like  the  enterprise  zone 
programs in the US and Europe and/or housing projects in the US, council housing in the 
UK, HLM in France, etc.) or people-targeted policies (like the MTO programs in the 
US).  
For China, place-targeted policies would mean revitalize urban villages (the government 
either  invests  directly  in  renovating  and  modernizing  buildings  in  urban  villages  or 
induce firms to establish there by waiving their taxes) while people-targeted policies 
would imply to move poor people (both illegal migrants and poor local urban hukou 
holders) from urban villages and/or poor areas to richer areas by paying the difference in 
housing prices (like the MTO programs in the US). Of course, place-targeted policies and 
people-targeted policies are not exclusive and can be implemented together.  
One has to be, however, careful with these policies as other questions arise. Indeed, if the 
Chinese government integrates urban villages into city administration, then what will be 
the fate of housing there and the owners (original rural hukou holders in those villages). 
Will the government pay off those owners, tear down the housing (for villages on prime 
land)?  In  that  case,  they  would  need  a  person-based  approach  (i.e.  people-targeted 
policies). Also for urban villages on the city fringes, is it upgrading housing that prevails? 
 
(2) Should China subsidize housing in cities? Should China encourage social 
housing and see it as a long-term solution? 
 
Because of the hukou system, Chinese urban migrants rarely build their own houses, 
either  living in  employer-provided accommodation  or  renting  rooms  from  established 
residents. The 1997 Beijing survey reports that almost 50% of migrants stayed in work-
related housing and another 25% in rented dwellings. In the same year in Shanghai, about 
one-third  of  migrants  labeled  ‘‘temporary’’  lived  in  dormitories  and  another  third  in 
rentals  (Wu,  2002).  As  a  result,  it  should  be  clear  that  the  hukou  system  is  quite 
inefficient since it makes rural migrants (i.e. non-hukou holders) separated in the social, 
physical, and labor market spaces. In 2005, 74 million people with rural hukou lived in 
cities (Henderson, 2009). Furthermore, migrants tend to leave the countryside at age 16-
17 and rarely return. As a result, rural-urban migration tends to be permanent and the big 
issue  is  the  distinction  between  formal  and  informal  sector  markets.  The  latter  (i.e. 
informality)  is  not  that  good  because  basically  rural  migrants  do  not  learn  much  by 
migrating to cities since, as Solinger (1999) put it, they “take up most of the 3-D (Dirty, 
Dangerous and Demanding) jobs shunned by urban workers.” In particular, they do not interact with urban residents, who are usually more educated, and thus don’t benefit from 
local externalities.  
In this context, social housing for rural (illegal) migrants could be efficient since it would 
make  the  informal  sector  formal  and  would  allow  rural  migrants  to  live  in  decent 
housing. By social housing, we mean (directly or indirectly) subsidizing housing for the 
poor by either targeting places or people (see our answer to question (1) above). 
Indeed, after 2002, rural-urban hukou conversions were decentralized to provinces and 
there has been an upsurge in hukou conversions. According to Henderson (2009), an 
estimate of 90 million of such conversions has occurred between 2000 and 2007. These 
90 million represent permanent migration. This is coupled with a farm labor force still in 
excess of 300 million, perhaps 200 million of which are truly excess labor. As a result, 
there is a clear tendency for making rural migration permanent. So social housing would 
certainly improve the living conditions of rural (permanent) migrants by providing them 
with decent housing. 
One  worry  with  giving  subsidized  housing  to  migrants  is  that  it  encourages  more 
migration into  cities  like  Beijing  where such  encouragement  is  problematic.  There  is 
therefore  a  trade  off  between  equity  (migrants  versus  non-migrants  for  housing)  and 
efficiency  (subsidizing  in-migration  effectively).  Indeed,  on  the  one  hand,  giving 
subsidies to migrants will encourage more migration. On the other hand, you want them 
to live in decent housing condition. In Song and Zenou (2010), we show for the city of 
Shenzhen that the price of land of non urban-village residents is negatively affected by 
nearby urban villages. In other words, the closer one resides from an urban village, the 
higher are the negative externalities this person gets (especially in terms of the value of 
his/her house). So even if the local government totally ignores illegal migrants and urban 
villages, it cannot ignore the fact that it affects urban hukou holders who live nearby 
these urban villages. 
Finally, if the Chinese government continues to ease the hukou rules, then there will be 
important effects on both the demand and the supply sides. On the demand side, the 
easing of hukou rules will stimulate demand for low income housing outside the urban 
villages in cities. This  will encourage the filtering of existing housing  to serve these 
households.  But  these are  very  poor  households,  so  we  should  be  wary  of  rules  and 
standards imposed outside of the urban villages that do not allow low quality housing to 
be supplied to the poor. Public health and safety are crucial concerns of government, but 
rules on crowding, privacy, and shared facilities, may quickly become excessive. On the 
supply  side,  we  should  not  encourage  substantial  upgrading  of  housing  in  the  urban 
villages beyond the capacity of the poor to pay. We'd prefer a glut of slum housing to its 
elimination  --  driving  down  the  cost  of  accommodation.  We  should  encourage  the 
integration of land use planning in cities to include the urban villages, but we should be 
careful not to let this reduce the supply of low income housing. Ideally, subsidy programs 
for  renters  should  be  demand-oriented  (vouchers  and  the  like,  i.e.  person-targeted 
policy). But since so many of the urban poor and emancipated rural migrants work in the 
informal sector, it would be hard to identify eligibles and to manage such a program. As a 
result, a place-targeted policy could be more efficient.  
 
 
 (3) Should we encourage or suppress urban villages in China? 
 
Rural  migrants are  constrained in  several aspects.  Most  of  rural  migrant  laborers  are 
taking low-income jobs in cities, which limits their capacity to consume urban housing 
units in the commercial housing market. Albeit working longer hours, rural migrants earn 
less income (for example, 18% lower in 1999) than urban residents (Liu, et al., 2003). 
They  are  thus  constrained  by  their  financial  capabilities.  In  addition,  migrants  are 
excluded from the urban housing market because of institutional restrictions associated 
with the urban hukou system.  As such, programs aiming at eliminating urban villages 
and improving physical environment in urban villages would likely be largely ineffectual 
and harmful to China’s economy. As stated above, without complementary consideration 
of re-housing current rural migrants, the renewal of villages within cities is obviously a 
planning action at the expense of rural migrants.  
To  be  more  precise,  I  believe  that  urban  villages  play  an  important  role  in 
accommodating rural migrants. This is a realistic solution, however, only in the short run. 
But, as stated above, these villages are totally separated from other areas in the city, 
which means that there are no interactions between urban residents and illegal migrants 
living in urban villages. As a result, in the long run, the government should officially 
recognize these urban villages and provide the rural migrants with decent social housing. 
Unless the Chinese government wants these villages to become favelas (as in Brazil), it 
should bring them under urban governance and planning, and provide them with local 
public services. This may be delicate act (respecting the property rights of the original 
villages), while moving them under urban rather than collective governance.  
 
(4) Should China create jobs in rural areas? 
 
This could be done following the example of the Entreprise Zone (EZ) or empowerment 
zone  programs  implemented  both  in  the  US  and  in  Europe.  For  China,  it  would  be 
interesting to have enterprise zone programs in rural areas to attract firms establishing 
there. This would be a complementary policy to those advocated in urban areas (see our 
answer  to  question  (1)).  All  firms  that  become  established  in  these  areas  would  be 
exempted from tax (pay-rolls taxes) during a certain period (typically five years). The 
idea of this policy is to decrease the “distance” between local rural workers and firms and 
help these workers stay in rural areas. In return, each firm must hire 20-30 percent of 
their employees from the local rural population. As stated above, this is a place-oriented 
policy and it should be implemented together with a people-oriented policy such as the 
MTO programs. 
 
(5) Can microfinance work in China? 
 
An alternative policy (implemented in Africa and India) to public housing that can help 
improve access to affordable housing and reduce the spread of slums is microfinance. 
Chapters 6 and 7 of United Nations Habitat (2005) provide a well-informed discussion of 
recent developments. The chapters contrast four forms of loans, mortgage finance by 
banks,  microenterprise  finance,  shelter  microfinance,  and  community  funds. 
Microenterprise  finance  is  targeted  to  small  entrepreneurs,  shelter  microfinance  to households with land who wish to improve their structures,  and community funds to 
those without secure tenure for the construction of basic housing and infrastructure. A 
dominant theme is that shelter microfinance agencies and community organizations need 
links to the state to provide funding on the required scale but that establishing these links 
carries with it the dangers of bureaucratization. 
Let us explain in more  detail how microfinance works and how it can  be applied to 
China.
31 Microfinance has established itself as an integral part of financial sector policies 
of developing countries in the past decade. The practice started in the 1970s as a pilot 
project  in  Bangladesh  and  has  rapidly  spread  around  the  globe.  Currently  around  70 
million low-income individuals are served by  microfinance institutions (Daley-Harris, 
2003).  The  essence of  microfinance  is  to draw  ideas  from  existing  “informal  sector” 
credit mechanisms – like intra-family loans, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs), and local moneylenders – while creating a viable conduit for capital infusions 
from  formal  sector  banks,  donors,  and  governments.  Because  of  the  lack  of  formal 
financial  institutions  in  urban  villages  for  rural  migrants  in  China,  subsidies  to 
entrepreneurs  can  be  channeled  through  state-run  banks,  as  for  example  the  famous 
Grameen Bank in India, which lend money to the poor at reasonable interest rates and 
without requiring collateral. It works as follows. The Grameen Bank holds a meeting in a 
village  and  announces  that  it  will  soon  introduce  a  new  kind  of  banking  operation. 
Individuals interested in borrowing will get loans for their own, independent projects, but 
they must approach the bank with four others who similarly seek loans. These five-person 
groups meet with a loan officer from the bank once each week, at which time loans are 
disbursed and payments are made. The loan contract has a twist, which is that should a 
borrower be unable to repay his/her loan, he/she will have to quit his/her membership of 
the bank – as will his/her four fellow group members. While the others are not forced 
explicitly to repay for the potential defaulter, they have clear incentives to do so if they 
wish to continue obtaining future loans. The key is that Grameen Bank loans (like loans 
from  other  microlenders)  are  more  attractive  than  loans  from  other  sources  like 
moneylenders. While moneylenders may charge interest rates over 100 per cent per year, 
the  Grameen  Bank  keeps  its  official  rates  at  20  per  cent  (and  even  with  extra  fees, 
effective rates are below 30 per cent per year).  
Allowing borrowers to voluntarily form their own groups helps microlenders overcome 
an  “adverse  selection”  problem  (Ghatak,  2000;  Armendáriz  de  Aghion  and  Gollier, 
2000). The problem is that a traditional bank has a difficult time distinguishing between 
inherently “risky” and “safe” borrowers in its pool of loan applicants; if it could, the bank 
would  charge  a  high  interest  rate  to  the  risky  borrower  and  a  lower  one  to  the  safe 
borrower. But without precise information, the bank must charge the same (high) rates to 
all potential borrowers, and this can trigger the exit of safe borrowers from the credit 
market (this is referred to as the “lemon” problem; see Akerlof, 1970). The outcome is 
inefficient since, in an ideal world, projects undertaken by both risky and safe borrowers 
should  be  financed.  One  advantage  of  the  group  lending  methodology  (at  least  in 
principle) is that it can put local information to work for the outside lender. Adverse 
selection is mitigated under the group lending methodology. 
                                                 
31 For an overview, see, in particular, Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) and Yunus (2008). 
 There  is  no  reason  why  this  should  not  work  in  China.  Microfinance  could  be  an 
alternative (or a complement) to creating jobs and increasing the education level in rural 
areas. Indeed, we should give migrants the opportunity to create jobs or start their own 
projects, either at home (in the rural area) or in the city. Migrants in China are generally 
very entrepreneurial (see e.g. Ma, 2002) with many “self-employed” -- the question is 
how they finance their projects. Microfinance could be a good way to achieve this goal. 
As in India (Merill, 2009), microfinance could also help provide adequate shelter and 
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